Political Ambitions Regarding Nakhijevan and Possible Effects of Opening the ‘Zangezur Corridor’: Part 3
Genesis Armenia think tank has published the third part of the article by Candidate of Political Sciences Abraham Gasparyan and historian Armen Sargsyan, titled “Political Ambitions Regarding Nakhijevan and Possible Effects of Opening the ‘Zangezur Corridor'” (Part 1, Part 2). The article is presented below․
Part 3
Iran and Azerbaijan: Iran, which borders Nakhijevan, has its own interests as well. According to Iranian experts, 40-45% of Nakhijevan’s population has a pro-Iranian orientation. Turkey’s growing presence in Nakhijevan also creates tension with Iran. Iran is carefully monitoring the strengthening of Turkey’s military and political influence in Nakhijevan, and is particularly concerned about the processes regarding the opening of the Meghri corridor, viewing them as a threat to its border security.
Currently, interesting economic relations have developed between Iran and Nakhijevan; Nakhijevan has a serious economic dependence on Iran. Iran is already the main supplier of food and energy resources (electricity, gas), and is gradually creating its own infrastructure here, connecting the region with the “Greater Iranian Region”. For example, Iran has built a gas pipeline in Nakhijevan, which was commissioned in December 2005 and has a capacity of 1 billion cubic meters. Anti-Iranian elements in Nakhijevan are mainly in the army and among officials who are considered members of the so-called “Nakhijevan clan.” To summarize, Iran is increasingly strengthening its positions particularly in Nakhijevan, as well as in Talish and Mughan. Sometimes Azerbaijan is “forced” to make concessions on certain issues because the only land route connecting it with Nakhijevan now passes through Iran, and Iran keeps them dependent by allowing them to pass through its territory. Moreover, during some tense moments in Iran-Azerbaijan relations, Iran has closed this route several times for short periods. It is also worth noting that this is the main route by which people emigrate from Nakhijevan to Russia, and according to Iranian experts, nine out of 10 migrants have an anti-Iranian orientation. It should also be emphasized that Iran relies on the Shiite population in Nakhijevan when implementing its policies, regardless of ethnicity.
Armenia and Nakhijevan: Not only geopolitical changes in the South Caucasus but also any changes occurring in Armenia can significantly impact the Nakhijevan-Armenia relations. In this situation, what should Armenia do?
Armenia should promote the issue of protecting its territorial integrity on the global stage and demonstrate the dangers of the Zangezur corridor for global order and security. Armenia must pay serious attention to strengthening its borders. By focusing on border security, it is necessary to enhance military effectiveness and increase the role of military diplomacy. New defensive structures should be built in border areas.
In the field of regional diplomacy, Armenia should strive to restore or strengthen its relations with Iran and Georgia, as their interests are directly linked to the stability of this region. Iran is particularly opposed to the Zangezur corridor, which can be used to strengthen diplomatic positions. Economic integration is very important for Armenia as it can become a transit hub for other projects.
Armenia should make the most of its connections with the European Union, India, and China.
Conclusion
1. Currently, the influence of Turkey and Iran in Nakhijevan is increasing, along with the population’s orientation toward Iran and Turkey.
2. The fate of the so-called “Zangezur corridor” is of great significance for the situation in Nakhijevan. To increase its influence in Nakhijevan, it is advantageous for Iran to maintain the current state of the “Zangezur corridor,” while for Azerbaijan and Turkey, it is the opposite. By opening this “corridor,” Azerbaijan and Turkey aim to close Armenia’s territorial integrity in their own way by connecting Nakhijevan with the main part of Azerbaijan. The implementation of this project could lead to Armenia’s isolation, limiting not only economic but also security opportunities.
3. It is an axiom that Nakhijevan and the “Zangezur corridor” have strategic significance for pan-Turkic policy.
4. The opening of the “Zangezur corridor” means Iran’s expulsion from Nakhijevan, as Iran maintains its influence in Nakhijevan mainly through gas, electricity supplies, and food exports. If the corridor opens, it will be Azerbaijan that will carry out all of this.
a. Iran will be “pushed out” of Nakhijevan;
b. Azerbaijan will establish its dominance in Nakhijevan, and influence there will mainly be established by Azerbaijan and Turkey.
5. If the above is implemented, Armenia will “hit” its strategic ally Iran, and Armenia and Iran will permanently lose their influence over Nakhijevan, green-lighting Turkey and Azerbaijan’s strategic plans.
Regrettably, Nikol Pashinyan has already expressed the idea that the opening of communications through Syunik primarily concerns pipelines and power lines.
6. It is also a fact that the ceasefire statement of November 9, 2020, stipulates the guarantee of the Republic of Armenia for ensuring the security of transport communication between Azerbaijan and Nakhijevan in both directions, with the aim of organizing unhindered movement of people, vehicles, and cargo. Turkey actively supports this project, considering it an important means to increase its regional influence. The opening of the corridor will not only strengthen the Turkey-Azerbaijan connection but will also enhance Turkey’s geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus.
7. For Turkey, Nakhijevan is not only a gateway to the South Caucasus but also a platform for deepening its regional policy, strengthening its influence, and consolidating its positions. However, it should be noted that all of this intensifies the tension between Turkey, Iran, and Armenia.
The future: In the future, Nakhijevan could play a significant role in the context of regional politics and security. Its future will depend on the strategies of both the central authorities of Azerbaijan and regional actors. As mentioned, any regional turmoil brings closer the revival of the Treaty of Kars. In our opinion,
a. The Treaty of Kars will gradually become relevant. Let’s refer to the facts. Let’s recall the Jan. 19, 1990 decision of the Supreme Council of Nakhijevan which, citing the Treaty of Kars, declared the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic as an independent state.
In connection with the events in Adjara in 2004, the Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan referred to the Treaty of Kars, noting that under it, Turkey has the right to intervene in case of escalation of tensions in Adjara, while Georgia has the same patronage over Adjara as Azerbaijan does over Nakhijevan.
In relation to the Adjara events, in May 2004, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Georgian Parliament discussed the issue of revising and annulling the Treaty of Kars amid rising tensions in Adjara. Only Armenia, which signed the Treaty of Kars, has not addressed that treaty to this day.
b. Iran will continue to take serious steps to strengthen its presence in Nakhijevan by enhancing the creation of economic infrastructure.
c. Turkey and Azerbaijan are currently able to maintain their dominance in Nakhijevan mainly through the military, intelligence, and officials, and the strengthening of their future influence depends on the opening of the “Zangezur corridor.”
d. Public sentiments in Nakhijevan will gradually become stronger.
e. Nakhijevan’s economic dependence on Azerbaijan will gradually weaken if the corridor does not open.
In fact, if the Azerbaijani army were not stationed in Nakhijevan, Nakhijevan would quickly “roll” toward the process of independence from Azerbaijan, which is also facilitated by the dictatorship established by I. Aliyev.
