The Possibility of Turkey’s Geopolitical Entry into the South Caucasus in the Context of the Politicization of the Kurdish Factor in Syria: Part 1

Genesis Armenia think tank has published the first part of an article titled “The Possibility of Turkey’s Geopolitical Entry into the South Caucasus in the Context of the Politicization of the Kurdish Factor in Syria”. The article is presented below:

“2025 will not be an easy year. Everyone is holding their breath, waiting for the new U.S. administration, led by Donald Trump, to bring a breakthrough in international processes. There will, of course, be a breakthrough, but a reasonable amount of time is needed—at least 6–8 months. Changes in U.S. administration always have a serious impact on global processes. The Trump administration will need time to define its strategy, clarify priorities, and redefine communications with international players. In the near future, we will hear statements and see preliminary actions aimed at internal and external political balancing, and only after that should we expect changes. The question is: Is Armenia ready for this ‘transitional phase’ and how should we use this opportunity? It is undeniable that without a change of power in Armenia, significant changes in official policy are unimaginable. The ideology adopted and circulated by the authorities from 2018 to 2025 is philosophically and conceptually lacking, and its vision and values prove to be contrary. Instead of redefining the state’s strategic directions, only cosmetic changes are being made aimed at securing electoral support. Armenia needs profound reforms in economic policy, security strategy, and foreign relations, and the change of power should not imply a mere ‘change of faces,’ but a radical reassessment of ideas, principles, and approaches. It must be accompanied by broad social mobilization and real programs, rather than vague slogans. Armenia must be prepared to resist the complete loss of state sovereignty through persistent efforts and avoid scenarios similar to those in Ukraine or Syria. Syria will become the epicenter of a new map or architecture of the Greater Middle East. After Bashar al-Assad’s escape, the situation has changed: Ahmed al-Sharaa, or Mohammad al-Julani, who has led the Syrian opposition extremist groups since 2017 and has had unconditional support from Turkey, is signaling that he does not intend to make the partitioning of Syria or the federalization policy a priority agenda, no matter how much Ankara, as the leader of neo-Ottoman policies, tries to impose it on the new Syrian administration. Saudi Arabia, the main contender for the consolidation of the Sunni world, is opposed to Turkey’s neo-Ottoman manifestations in Syria, which means that the U.S. also has reservations about Ankara’s geopolitical ambitions and dominance in Syria. Turkey wants to arm the new Syrian army and has spent billions to overthrow Bashar al-Assad and expand its ideology, language, religious orientation, and networks within the Syrian armed forces. This, of course, meets with clear resistance from the Gulf Arab states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have different plans concerning the economic, geopolitical, and communal peaceful coexistence in the Middle East, mainly in Syria and Lebanon, which directly and indirectly contradict Turkish expansionist plans and Qatar’s ambitions to serve them. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the largest donors to the reconstruction of post-war Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, and the Gaza Strip, and will try to limit the unbridled flow of Turkish finance to these countries, preventing its political capitalization. After neutralizing the Iranian geopolitical and doctrinal Shiite factor in Syria and Lebanon, it is unlikely that the mentioned states would want to fill the created security, economic, and ideological vacuum with Turkish influence. The map is tangled, and the situation is, to say the least, extremely serious: the noose is tightening around Iran as much as possible, which is at the center of this puzzle. In January, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council visited the South Caucasus, and the main political message of his visit was that Tehran will strike hard against any country that attempts to provide land or logistical support for anti-Iranian operations in possible military actions by the West. The West has succeeded in neutralizing Iran in Syria and Lebanon; now it is time to limit the role of political Shiism or ‘expel’ it from Iraq and Yemen. Iran will respond to the forced Anaconda Plan in its northern borders, which is currently the only territory where there is no Western military presence. Ankara and Baku have come to understand that any aggression against Iran or active involvement in potential U.S. or Israeli operations will have serious consequences, including a lack of diplomatic tools. What stance do Yerevan and Baku hold on this issue? Clearly, there are no overt ambitions. Armenia’s participation in potential military operations against Iran carries the significant risk of it losing its sovereignty and subjectivity. Yerevan repeatedly stated that it would not participate in anti-Iranian actions before 2018. However, the calculations regarding Azerbaijan are different. Tehran’s stance on granting Azerbaijan a land route or a “corridor” through Syunik to Nakhijevan is firm and tough. Since 2022, Iran’s political, military, and spiritual leadership has been warning that the creation of such a corridor threatens Iran’s national security, and Tehran would resort to military actions if necessary. In this context, it is interesting to consider a potential scenario where the current Armenian regime and the Azerbaijani authorities might agree to a “peace treaty”, under which roads and communications could be unblocked, and if Armenia does not resist the threats from Baku, it may grant Azerbaijan a “corridor,” thereby excluding Iran’s military response. In such a case, the issue of the route or “corridor” would be resolved at least 100 kilometers away from Iran’s borders, meaning not through Meghri but Sisian. It is natural that at this strategic depth, Iran cannot intervene militarily. What would the CSTO or Russia do in this situation? If Armenia does not turn to the military-political organization, there will be no response. However, if they do appeal, Russia will officially turn to the Armenian authorities to implement Point 9 of the trilateral Statement of November 9, 2020. There are no Russian border guards at the Armenia-Iran border, and control is carried out by Armenian border forces. Furthermore, the current Armenian authorities are overtly—but in fact evasively—unwilling to involve the Russian side in border control matters, fearing they would become a mediator in the conflict—regardless of whether this intervention would be positive or negative for Armenia. This means that if Yerevan and Baku negotiate without a third party’s involvement—and this is clearly not the case, as Azerbaijan negotiates with Yerevan with a common agenda with Ankara without the latter’s official participation, while Armenia without an ally or partner—Armenia will find itself caught between the Turkish axis, meaning that Baku and Ankara will continue to dictate terms and set out preconditions.”