Special Eurasia: ‘Armenia in the CSTO: A Strategic Look’: Geopolitical changes threaten with regional instability
Armenia’s suspension of CSTO participation represents a critical shift in regional security dynamics. While CSTO officials maintain Yerevan’s membership, the country’s disengagement raises concerns about alliance stability. The broader strategic implications include increased regional instability and shifts in Armenia’s security alliances. The strengthening of US-Armenian relations and Yerevan’s pursuit of EU membership introduce new geopolitical variables that require close monitoring.
Special Eurasia has presented a report titled “Armenia in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO): A Strategic Look”. The report assesses the geopolitical and security implications of Armenia’s stance and the potential outcomes for regional stability.
Armenia’s dissatisfaction with CSTO’s response to its security concerns, particularly regarding tensions with Azerbaijan, has led to a gradual disengagement. Despite this, CSTO officials maintain that Armenia remains a formal ally. Armenia’s decision to freeze participation while maintaining formal membership indicates a strategic recalibration of its security posture. The lack of financial contributions raises questions about the sustainability of its status within the organization. While Russian officials acknowledge potential discussions if Armenia fails to contribute by 2026, they have refrained from suggesting outright expulsion. While Yerevan’s strategic partnership with the United States strengthens its integration into the Western sphere of influence, encompassing economic and security dimensions.
The geopolitical implications extend beyond Armenia’s immediate CSTO disengagement. Relations between Armenia and Russia have deteriorated since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, which saw Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan take office amid accusations of Western influence. Moscow’s dissatisfaction with Armenia’s deepening ties to the West has been evident, particularly in its response to Azerbaijan’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh. The Kremlin’s inaction during the 9-months blockade and subsequent attack on the Armenian population of Artsakh by Baku, may have served as a warning to Yerevan about the consequences of distancing itself from Russian security guarantees. With relations between Moscow and Yerevan at an all-time low, there is no guarantee that the Kremlin would intervene against Azerbaijan, which remains a convenient partner in gas distribution. However, Baku, much like Ankara, navigates its foreign alliances with strategic ambivalence, adding to the fluidity of the situation. Armenia has pursued closer ties with the United States and European Union. High-level engagements between Armenian officials and Western intelligence and diplomatic figures have been frequent, including visits by CIA Director William Burns and meetings with Britain’s MI6 chief Richard Moore. The US has also significantly increased financial support to Armenian NGOs through USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy. In 2025, Armenia’s parliament initiated legislation towards EU accession, signalling a long-term strategic shift. Further complicating the regional balance, US political figures, including President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance, have pledged support for Armenia, citing religious and humanitarian concerns. However, previous US commitments have not always translated into concrete action, raising uncertainty about Washington’s reliability as a security partner. In fact, the prior Biden administration explicitly stated that the United States would not tolerate ethnic cleansing in Artsakh; however, following the occurrence of such acts, not only was there a lack of intervention or sanctions against Baku but also the US Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mark Libby, implicitly endorsed these actions by participating in an Azerbaijani-sponsored propaganda tour of towns from which Armenians had been cleansed.
Although the US is the dominant global military power, it is not the primary actor in the Caucasus. If Azerbaijan were to launch an attack on Armenia, Washington would face significant challenges in providing military support. Armenia’s geographical isolation exacerbates the logistical difficulties of deploying forces to the region. All of Armenia’s neighbouring states present strategic obstacles. Turkey is a staunch ally of Azerbaijan and would provide direct backing. Georgia, despite historical tensions with Azerbaijan, remains closely tied to Baku through economic and energy dependence, with approximately 90% of its gas supply sourced from Azerbaijan. Iran is unlikely to offer either its territory or its airspace for Western military operations. As a result, Armenia is strategically encircled. Conversely, Russia, despite lacking the economic power of the US, has a greater capacity to intervene due to its longstanding regional presence. While Washington may exercise caution in confronting Ankara due to its NATO membership, Russia does not share this constraint. Historically, Russia and Turkey have engaged in multiple conflicts over control of the Caucasus, and Turkey’s regional ambitions remain a point of concern for the Kremlin. Additionally, the role of the CSTO in a potential conflict remains uncertain. While Russia leads the alliance, internal divisions exist. Armenia’s strategic pivot towards the West not only facilitates economic diversification through European and US financial assistance (which might substitute the economic reliance on Russia) but also positions the country as a potential base for Western intelligence activities in the Caucasus, particularly concerning Russia and Iran. Given the absence of direct Western intervention during Azerbaijan’s previous military actions, although it violated international law, Yerevan may seek to strengthen its partnerships by offering strategic cooperation in exchange for deeper security and economic ties. On the other hand, severing economic ties with Russia and the EAEU, while also hosting Western intelligence activities—potentially straining economic relations with Iran—could prove counterproductive. Azerbaijan poses the most immediate security threat to Armenia, having already seized control of Nagorno-Karabakh and now turning its attention to Armenia’s southern regions, which it refers to as ‘Western Azerbaijan.’ Within the CSTO, several member states also belong to the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), including Kazakhstan. While Astana’s leadership relied on CSTO intervention to quell a coup attempt, creating an expectation of reciprocal support in the event of aggression against another member, its close ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan may override these obligations. Given its strategic alignment with Baku and Ankara, Astana could ultimately refuse to commit troops to Armenia’s defence in the event of an Azerbaijani attack. While Armenia seeks to deepen cooperation with the Western block, historical patterns suggest Western responses to crises in the region have been inconsistent. A failure to secure robust security guarantees could leave Armenia vulnerable to external threats, particularly from Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Armenia’s geographic and political isolation limits its strategic options, raising the stakes for any realignment. Additionally, the shifting geopolitical landscape increases the likelihood of Russian countermeasures. Moscow may employ economic or political pressure to reassert influence, particularly if Armenia’s NATO-aligned relationships strengthen. Azerbaijan may also escalate its territorial ambitions, interpreting Armenia’s realignment as a strategic vulnerability. The prospect of military confrontation remains, with CSTO’s response uncertain.
