Thomas de Waal: The text of the agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan lacks the elements that deal with the legacy of conflicts
On March 13, in separate statements, Azerbaijan and Armenia said they had finally settled their differences on the text of an agreement to normalize relations for the first time after more than three decades of conflict, Thomas de Waal writes.
The announcement was described as “historic” by U.S Secretary of State Marco Rubio. European Union High Representative Kaja Kallas called it “a decisive step.”
“The second statement is a bit nearer the mark. This is one big step forward that stabilizes the South Caucasus—but several more are needed before full peace can be attained,” the expert noted.
According to him, the international context is critical. As Moscow and Washington negotiate over Ukraine’s future, the Armenians in particular fear a scenario where Russia, unburdened by war, will turn an aggressive gaze on the South Caucasus once again. Agreeing, even in principle, to the text of a bilateral peace agreement to open diplomatic relations between the two adversaries gives Moscow less leverage to interfere. The breakthrough came after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s team agreed to give ground on two outstanding issues in the twelfth draft of a seventeen-article text that had been negotiated for more than a year. One important yet unresolved issue is being negotiated separately: that of connectivity and the modalities for the restoration of road and rail links, especially the route that connects western Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan across Armenian territory. De Waal noted that the document lacks the elements that usually accompany a historic peace agreement and deal with the legacy of conflict, such as justice mechanisms for war crimes or pledges on the right of return for displaced people. There is no mention of the issue over which both nations fought two wars, lost thousands of lives, and suffered unbearable pain. The issue of the Armenian-majority region of Nagorno-Karabakh was settled by force in September 2023 when Azerbaijan captured Karabakh, and its entire Armenian population of 100,000 people fled.
Pashinyan now acknowledges that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, and no one expects that the Karabakh Armenians will return home any time soon. The Azerbaijani side demands an amendment to the Armenian Constitution. “The constitution issue is surely fixable with some creative diplomacy—and also because Pashinyan himself wants a new constitution after the next parliamentary election, due in 2026. But Pashinyan has given away a lot, and his pockets are now almost empty. He wants to go into that election telling the public that he has secured a peace agreement—not, as his critics claim, merely capitulated to Azerbaijan. And the harder that Azerbaijan presses on this constitution issue, the harder it will be for Pashinyan to deliver,” the expert states. Pashinyan presents the decision Armenians face as a fundamental philosophical choice between what he calls “Real Armenia” and “Historic Armenia.” He essentially tells voters that, having suffered major military defeats to Azerbaijan in 2020 and 2023, Armenia must now accept a new reality: that it must try to make peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey, open its borders and connections to Europe, and free itself from a dangerous dependence on Russia. Azerbaijani officials say fairly openly that they are in no hurry and believe a peace agreement will benefit Armenia more than Azerbaijan. In public, President Ilham Aliyev never refers to the benefits of peace or says anything positive about Pashinyan. Conflict with Armenia is still instrumentalized to unify the country under his leadership.
Just a few hours before the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry announced the breakthrough in negotiations, Aliyev gave an aggressive speech in which he repeated the maximalist claims, grievances, and accusations against Armenia he has made for several years. The expert believes that Brussels and Washington can be more proactive in supporting the connectivity agenda and opening of borders in particular. But the key actor is Ankara. Ankara currently wants two things at the same time, and sooner or later it will have to choose. Turkish interlocutors say they know that normalization with Armenia makes Turkey a stronger player in the South Caucasus, loosens Russia’s historical hold over Armenia, and is good for impoverished eastern Turkish border regions. They say Pashinyan is an ideal partner for them. Yet they also say—and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is personally invested in this—that Azerbaijan is a close Turkic brother state and that they must defer to Baku before moving forward.
