Eurasianet: Armenia at a “constitutional crossroads”: A better or worse future?
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan outlined his vision for the country’s transformation, which he frames as “Real Armenia,” in late February. It stresses the need for entrepreneurship and a new understanding of the meaning of patriotism, focusing on the future and letting go of the past, Eurasianet writes.
From Pashinyan’s standpoint, strategic necessity dictates a need for a new constitution: Armenia’s long-standing partnership with Russia has crumbled, undermining Armenian security. Now, Armenia must adapt to become “more viable in the new geopolitical and regional conditions.”
Given that Pashinyan’s government has lost all trust in Russia as a security guarantor, the Real Armenia doctrine calls for the country’s geopolitical reorientation away from Moscow toward the United States and European Union, as reflected in Yerevan’s recent decision to embark on the EU accession process. This places Armenia in a difficult position because the country’s economy remains dependent on Russia as a trading partner and energy supplier. The Kremlin is not likely to stand by and do nothing as Pashinyan proceeds with his geopolitical pivot. At the same time, it is unlikely Armenia can receive any serious security guarantees or transformative economic support from the US and EU soon. Currently, Western support is more symbolic and rhetorical rather than practical. Considering the domestic tensions and external pressures, one of three possible outcomes is likely. The chances for Armenia’s rapid strategic realignment seem low at present, given that Pashinyan appears to lack a critical mass of popular support for the “Real Armenia” doctrine. Russia could apply economic and diplomatic pressure, and Azerbaijan could seek additional territorial or economic concessions from Yerevan to paralyze Armenian governance and, potentially, topple Pashinyan. Another scenario involves the incremental adaptation of Pashinyan’s vision. If he can get Azerbaijan to sign the peace treaty, Pashinyan can buy himself some time. He may have to push back his timeline for a new constitution, but the fact that domestic forces opposed to the government’s agenda currently lack unity gives Pashinyan what looks to be a decent chance of securing reelection in 2026. He could then work to recalibrate relationships with Russia, Azerbaijan, the United States and EU while building domestic consensus for the Real Armenia program. The process would involve economic diversification, careful engagement with Azerbaijan and deepening ties with the US and EU without triggering regional destabilization. Armenia now stands at a constitutional crossroads with a peace agreement awaiting signatures. There is no way of telling how Pashinyan’s ambitious initiative to remake Armenian society and secure the country’s sovereignty will turn out. The process over the coming months and years will test the limits of Pashinyan’s political and diplomatic skills and will shape Armenia’s future to better or worse for decades to come.
