What happened on the eve of the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921?
Genesis Armenia think tank has published the first part of an article titled “What Happened on the Eve of the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921?” by PhD in political science Abraham Gasparyan and historian Armen Sargsyan. The article is presented below:
On the Eve of the Moscow Treaty
Despite ideological differences, the revolutions in Russia and Turkey had a significant impact on the military and political events of 1920-1921 due to their overlapping geopolitical interests. A common perception about the Moscow Treaty is that it laid the foundation for the Kars Treaty. However, often overlooked is the fact that the Moscow Treaty itself was based on the draft friendship agreement prepared during the first Kemalist-Bolshevik conference in Moscow on Aug. 24, 1920. This agreement was another example of policies directed against the Armenian people. Under this draft, Bolshevik Russia not only committed to providing financial and military aid to Kemalist Turkey but also recognized Turkey’s National Pact, which included territories that had come under Ottoman control through the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, 1918. The primary goal of the Kemalist movement was to restore Turkey’s territorial integrity, which it sought to achieve by eliminating the so-called “Armenian wedge” in the region. On Jan. 28, 1920, the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul adopted the National Pact, which declared Turkey’s territorial integrity while excluding the Armenian Cause. The pact claimed Kars province up to the Akhuryan (Arpachay) and Arax (Aras) rivers as part of Turkey. Notably, the Russian delegation leader, Soviet Foreign Commissar Georgy Chicherin, opposed this and demanded that Mush, Van, and Bitlis be returned to Armenia. However, due to contradictions in the negotiations, no treaty was signed at the time. Nevertheless, since the Kemalist-Bolshevik relations were orchestrated by Lenin and Atatürk, Chicherin’s objections were ultimately disregarded. On Dec. 2, 1920, the situation changed when Soviet rule was established in Armenia. The primary focus became the delimitation of borders between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as between Armenia and Georgia on the one side and Turkey on the other. Naturally, Armenian-Turkish relations had to be redefined on a new basis.
On Nov. 30, 1920, the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, led by N. Narimanov, and later, on Dec. 4, People’s Commissar for Nationalities I. V. Stalin in his article titled “Long Live Soviet Armenia”, clearly stated that Nakhijevan, Zangezur, and Karabakh are an inseparable part of Armenia.
It became essential to annul the illegitimate Treaty of Alexandropol. In the new political situation, the authorities of Soviet Armenia and Soviet Russia took the first steps to clarify relations with Turkey, annul the Treaty of Alexandropol, and fix the borders. On Dec. 5, the chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Armenian SSR, S. Kasyan, and B. Legran, through P. Mdivani and G. Ordzhonikidze, informed the Turks about the “necessity of recognizing Soviet Russia’s mediation in annulling the Treaty of Alexandropol.” A serious negotiation process unfolded between Russia and Armenia on one side and Turkey on the other. However, Turkey refused to engage in direct negotiations with Soviet Armenia, insisting that the Treaty of Alexandropol had already settled the issue and that its revision was “completely impossible.”
To resolve the aforementioned issues, it was decided to convene a new Soviet-Turkish conference. A delegation was formed to participate, led by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Armenian SSR, Aleksandr Bekzadyan. After receiving an invitation from Georgy Chicherin, Bekzadyan departed for Moscow.
There, the delegation presented the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR with a comprehensive package of documents, maps, records, and other materials. This package highlighted the strategic significance of Armenian territories such as Kars, Ardahan, Bayazet, Alexandropol, Surmalu, Nakhijevan, and Sharur-Daralagyaz, proposing that these territories be included within Soviet Armenia.
However, events took a different turn. In 1921, Kemal Atatürk began shifting his political strategy toward the West. On Jan. 15, 1921, he arrested Turkish communists and, tying stones around their necks, threw them into the sea. Thus, in Turkey—where Lenin had been assured that socialism would be spread in the East—Turkish communists were eliminated. Many believed this would negatively impact Russian-Turkish relations in favor of the Armenians, but they were mistaken. Losing his political foothold in Turkey, Lenin found himself in a weaker position when negotiating with Atatürk. The second Kemalist-Bolshevik conference took place in Moscow from Feb. 26 to March 16, 1921, based on the documents of the first Russian-Turkish conference (July-August 1920). Turkey kept rejecting Armenian territorial claims, which had been raised earlier by Georgy Chicherin during the first conference.
It is worth noting that on Dec. 26, 1920, during a meeting with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (HSSR) representatives A. Bekzadyan, A. Mravyan, and G. Atarbekyan, Vladimir Lenin, in response to their concerns about the “terrible situation of the Armenian people,” stated: “We are forced to temporarily sacrifice the interests of the Armenian workers for the sake of the global revolution. The same fate has befallen Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.” Instead, at that moment, Lenin considered aiding Armenia with food and money, as well as providing as many troops as possible to make Ankara “more accommodating.” He then added: “We are not going to wage war for Armenia against anyone, especially Kemal.” Under such circumstances, it was only natural that Kemalist Turkey turned the Armenian Cause into a bargaining chip between Soviet Russia and the Entente.
Interestingly, during the mentioned conference, the Turkish side believed that the Azerbaijani Soviet government had made a mistake and rushed to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhijevan, and Zangezur as an inseparable part of Armenia. It is also noteworthy that B. Legran wrote a letter to G. Chicherin, in which he confessed: “Since we are interested in helping the Kemalists, we cannot raise the Armenian issue sharply.”
In line with this, the Russian-Turkish negotiations proceeded in the same spirit before the signing of the Moscow Treaty. All the documents presented by the Armenian delegation were simply set aside.
To be continued
