The Prehistory of the Treaty of Kars: Part 3

Genesis Armenia think tank has published the third part (Part 1, Part 2)of the article titled “The Prehistory of the Treaty of Kars” by Abraham Gasparyan and historian Armen Sargsyan. The article is presented below:

Part 3

Immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Moscow, the Turks violated it and refused to withdraw their troops from Alexandrapol. G. Chicherin sent a note of protest to the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, demanding that the Turks immediately leave Alexandrapol. The note stated: “I would like to remind you that the Treaty of Alexandrapol was signed by the ARF government at a time when the Soviet government of Armenia had already been proclaimed, and that it is not ratified; under that agreement, the condition for its validity was its ratification within one month.” Let us note that Turkey also never ratified the Treaty of Alexandrapol. The Turks were forced to leave Alexandrapol on April 22, 1921, this time under the decisive pressure of the Russians, destroying the city.

This was not the only violation by the Turks after the signing of the Treaty of Moscow. Just a few days after the conclusion of the agreement, on March 24, 1924, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union G. Chicherin warned the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (RCP(B)), that the Turks might extract additional concessions from the republics, noting: “The Turkish delegation in Moscow categorically rejected our proposal to convene a general conference with the Caucasian delegations. It is clear that the Turks want to achieve additional results outside our immediate influence in Tiflis.” The opinion of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia, A. Bekzadyan, coincided with Chicherin’s view that the Turks should not sign separate agreements with the three Transcaucasian republics but should convene a general congress and sign an agreement. Today, a similar situation seems to have arisen for Armenia. Azerbaijan demands that Armenia sign a “peace” agreement with Armenia separately, without intermediaries, just as Turkey did after the Treaty of Moscow, while the Armenian authorities, with their weak position, fulfill all of Azerbaijan’s demands and surprisingly agree to sign a peace treaty without mediation.

In any case, in May 1921, the government of Soviet Armenia changed, and Askanaz Mravyan was appointed as the new People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. There is a viewpoint that the main reason for this change was A. Bekzadyan’s attitude toward the Moscow Agreement.

Both Russia and Turkey understood the necessity of agreements between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet republics as stipulated in Article 15 of the Treaty of Moscow, as without it, the international annulment of the treaty could not be ruled out in the future. The agreement signed with the Transcaucasian republics became known as the Treaty of Kars.

Let us note that prior to the Treaty of Kars, the Soviet Armenian authorities undertook preparatory work. On Aug. 21, 1921, a session of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee was held in Yerevan to discuss and summarize the Armenian side’s demands in a separate memorandum. In the political section of the memorandum, it was stated that border adjustments were necessary in the Surmalu area, primarily referring to the region rich in Koghb salt mines. The Armenian side hoped that this area would pass to Soviet Armenia. “Koghb is the only place from which Armenia can obtain salt without the special means required for exploitation. Salt is the only currency product in Armenian territory that can enable foreign trade.” The memorandum stated that by creating the Nakhijevan region and handing it over to Azerbaijan, Armenia was losing its land connection with Syunik, Vayots Dzor, and also Iran.

Another territorial claim concerned the neutral zone of Arpa, which the Armenians hoped to “expand and establish a mixed Armenian-Turkish administration.” Presumably, the Armenian side had in mind the ruins of the city of Ani, which was discussed during the talks of the Treaty of Kars, but was not specifically mentioned in the memorandum.

In the economic section, the Armenian side hoped to gain the right to exploit the coal mines of Olti and the arsenic mines of Kaghzvan, making the necessary payments to Turkey. The management of the Surmalu forests was also of great significance to Armenia, as “it was the only building material for Armenia.” The Armenian side proposed to organize the protection of the forests through joint efforts.

The Treaty of Kars: From Sept. 23 to Oct. 13, 1921, a conference was held in Kars between representatives of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, on one side, and representatives of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the other, with the participation of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). During this conference, Turkey once again demanded that separate agreements be signed with the Transcaucasian republics. It is clear that this demand was primarily directed against Armenia. However, under Moscow’s directive, the Transcaucasian republics rejected the Turkish proposal.

On Oct. 13, 1921, in Kars, a “treaty of friendship” was signed between Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan on one side and Turkey on the other, which mainly reiterated the key provisions of the Russian-Turkish Treaty of Moscow. The parties annulled all agreements signed between them, except for the Treaty of Moscow. The Treaty of Kars also marked the historical end of the Treaty of Alexandrapol.

The Kars negotiations also addressed the issue of the ruins of Ani passing to Armenia, but the parties, failing to reach an agreement in the wording, decided to leave the provisions of the Treaty of Moscow in place.

Article 5 excluded the subclause of the Treaty of Moscow that stated that Azerbaijan would not cede the “guardianship of Nakhijevan to a third state.” This instilled hope that Nakhijevan could be returned to Armenia in the future, especially as the issue became one of internal administrative territorial changes of the Soviet Republic and Turkey was no longer entitled to intervene in the fate of Nakhijevan.

However, unfortunately, on Feb. 9, 1924, the Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, as an autonomous republic, decided to include Nakhijevan in the Azerbaijan SSR.

The Treaty of Kars ratified the act of transferring Armenian territories to Turkey as stipulated in the Treaty of Moscow of March 16. The Kars Conference resolved no issues for Armenia; it nearly repeated the decisions made on March 16 in Moscow, with only the signature of the Armenian representative added. There is also a nuance that many do not pay attention to: One of the immediate outcomes of the Treaty of Kars was the resolution of the issue of Armenian POWs (Article 16), who were to be returned; and soon the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Armenian Republic announced the return of 688 prisoners, while this is not placed at the basis of the proposed “peace” agreement. Unlike the Treaty of Moscow, the Treaty of Kars also grants a small area in the autonomous region of Nakhijevan to the Armenian SSR.

The Treaty of Kars had only a negative impact: Armenia was forced to sign an agreement that stripped it of its own territories. Soviet Russia sacrificed the interests of the Armenian people for the sake of its eastern policy and the illusion of a global socialist revolution. S. Lukashin noted that the Treaty of Kars was “almost the same as the Treaty of Alexandrapol.” Soviet Armenia ratified the Treaty of Kars on March 20, 1922. Mustafa Kemal said in this regard that “the so-called Armenian Cause found its best solution with the Treaty of Kars.”

To be continued