How to build a global humanitarian diplomacy coalition with the goal of internationalizing the Artsakh issue?

At 11:59 a.m. on November 30, 2025, it was officially announced that the Minsk Process and all structures related to it would be dismantled.

Who made the decision and through what mechanism?

The decision was made by the organization’s Ministerial Council through the silent procedure mechanism—meaning that the decision enters into force if no participating state objects or opposes it before the deadline for the submitted draft. Since none of the 57 participating states expressed objections, the decision was adopted by consensus. This mechanism is what came into play.

In other words, without open discussion, the OSCE now has consensus that the Artsakh issue is settled. Let us not forget that under the OSCE Charter, the use of the silent procedure itself must also be agreed upon by all. If no objections were raised, the process is legally valid and legitimate.

What does this mean?

Who could have blocked or disrupted the process? Armenia, or states allied with, partnered with, or sharing interests with Yerevan. The logical conclusion of the process—now the silent closure of the issue—means that Armenia used its entire diplomatic arsenal to ensure that there would be no impasse-preventing outcome nor any continuation of the 33‑year‑long de jure process and mandate.

Is a return to the Minsk Group format possible?

Is it possible to reactivate the Minsk framework, once again placing Artsakh on the agenda? No. There are practical and legal obstacles. The closure of the issue is formal and final; the entire structure that sustained the process has been dissolved, and all previous decisions and regulations will be considered “not in force.”

To revive the process, a new consensus from all 57 participating states would again be required. Such a restart is possible only under one condition: all states must agree to resume it.

Nevertheless, with sufficient political will and determination, it is legally possible to create a new intergovernmental or multilateral format. But this would not be a “reopening” of the Minsk Group; it would be an entirely new format. Former mechanisms no longer have legal force—not to mention the fact that the relaunch of old mechanisms and formats does not have real political support.

What mechanisms exist to reopen the Artsakh issue within the OSCE?

• The closure of the Minsk Process shows that the procedure unfolded not only in the political sphere but also within legal and institutional boundaries. This means that dismantling international mediation formats is possible even if they have decades of history, and its relaunch is possible in conditions of universal political will, favorable geopolitical alignment, conflict of interests and consensus. If the majority of OSCE states—especially those concerned with this issue—do not agree, reactivation will not occur.
• In effect, the closure of the OSCE Minsk Process further narrows the scope for international efforts aimed at establishing a long-term, just and stable peace and security architecture in the South Caucasus.
• Armenia’s (future) diplomatic toolkit will have extremely limited capacity to revive steps aimed at a fair resolution of the conflict within the same platform, given the OSCE’s precedent-setting political consensus.

 

What success can we expect if we attempt to step into the same river?

• In the future, Yerevan must have a clear decision to restart the negotiation phase of the Artsakh conflict, based on internal legislation—the Constitution, legal acts (1989–1994), and the national security strategy, which relate to the need for peaceful conflict resolution and Armenia’s politically legitimate and legally recognized role as Artsakh’s security guarantor.
• Yerevan must apply to the OSCE Ministerial Council or the Permanent Council to place the issue back on the agenda within a new format. This, of course, demands heavy and complex work requiring serious diplomatic, ideological, human, intellectual, and administrative resources in line with OSCE procedural requirements. Even under the most optimistic scenario, I consider this unrealistic, given the unequivocal resistance of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and their Central Asian allied states.

 

Where to begin?

• Prepare for large-scale negotiations.
• For the objective evaluation of the conditions of Artsakh Armenians forcibly displaced to Armenia, request — in fact, make use of the available mechanism — the reactivation of the institution of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office’s Personal Representative, which also requires unanimous consensus among participating states.
• Granting a new OSCE mandate (optimistic scenario) may initially not require institutional or procedural expansion; instead, it could involve a mediation mandate aimed at facilitating civilized dialogue between Artsakh Armenians and Azerbaijanis (dialogue facilitation). Although this requires broad diplomatic support, it would have an informal and limited nature and would bypass the complex security-related issues.
• Establish new multilateral formats under the leadership of the EU and EU-partnership. As long as Brussels remains politically active and the EU is conducting its civilian border-monitoring mission in the South Caucasus and supporting horizontal civil-society dialogue, the EU’s direct involvement can open new institutional opportunities (monitoring, normative support, on-site support groups).

 

The revival of the Minsk Process has become nearly impossible. It is necessary to work toward the creation of new formats, and to remap allies and partners. This implies fostering an environment of international pressure, long-term legal internationalization of the Artsakh issue, and filing individual cases or state-level claims against Azerbaijan as the aggressor before the ECtHR.

Armenia, with the involvement of Diaspora lobbying bodies, must be able to build a global humanitarian diplomacy coalition with the goal of internationalizing the issue. Needless to say, this demanding, intellectually intensive, technically complex, organizationally meticulous, exhausting, and long-term work must be carried out after rejecting the anti-state narratives of the current government and removing the administration from power.

By Abraham Gasparyan