7 falsehoods about the documents published by the Armenian authorities on the Artsakh negotiations
Nikol Pashinyan’s public discourse surrounding the “publication of documents” related to the Artsakh negotiations—and the deceptive tactic (or manipulation) aimed at diverting attention from the domestic political and anti-church agenda—consists of several layers. In reality, materials of different nature and legal status have been bundled together into a single “package,” creating the impression that the political parties and presidents who held power between 1997 and 2018 signed a secret assignment, while he merely “revealed the truth.” What are the most glaring deceptions?
The concepts of “document” and “working material” are mixed up
Pashinyan published not signed, legally binding documents, but drafts, working papers, proposals, and interim formulations, which in diplomatic practice are never considered adopted decisions. He presents these materials as if they had been signed or approved, in order to create the impression that “the former authorities had surrendered Karabakh” and that “we inherited a dead-end situation,” and so on.
Wordplay manipulation around the “Lavrov Plan”
Pashinyan’s team repeatedly claims that Armenia was “handed” a document “based on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,” whereas in reality the so-called “Lavrov Plan” did not fix Artsakh’s final status within Azerbaijan.
It was based on a phased logic: the return of territories surrounding Artsakh, an interim status for Artsakh with international three-tier security guarantees, the deployment of peacekeepers, and clarification of the final status through a referendum or another international mechanism. The authorities presented Russia’s proposal within the OSCE Minsk Group framework as one in which Artsakh was “finally surrendered,” whereas in fact it was merely proposed as a discussible option for resolving the conflict and a basis for continuing talks, not as a binding document.
Chronological confusion: Mixing different years, phases, and proposals
The materials “published” by Pashinyan combine elements of the 2011 Kazan process, the 2014–2016 Lavrov proposals, and negotiation formulations introduced by his own team after 2018. He creates the illusion that the entire 1998–2018 period was a single continuous process of capitulation, whereas in reality each phase had entirely different negotiation legitimizations, power balances, and international attitudes.
Presenting their own formulations as “inherited”
During the 2020–2023 period, it was Pashinyan’s own team that adopted the formulation that “Artsakh is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.” This was a political choice made by the ruling Civil Contract party in 2022–2023, rooted in Pashinyan’s 2022 statement in Prague recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet the authorities continue to claim that the sacrifice of Armenia’s, Artsakh’s, and the Armenian people’s national and state interests is the result of “documents left behind by the former authorities,” which in fact does not correspond to the diplomatic practice of Armenia–Nagorno-Karabakh–Minsk Group co-chairmanship.
Portraying “declassification” as “transparency” and the “exposure of the opposition’s false narrative,” while the real aim is to strengthen weak domestic political positions and maintain the continuity of foreign political legitimacy
Pashinyan presents the publication of documents with the claim: “I revealed everything so that the people would know the truth.” In reality, this mechanism is used to evade historical and political responsibility for defeat, to shift and distract the public debate. From a diplomatic standpoint, this is an unprofessional and trust-eroding step, as the “publication” does not reveal the full reality of negotiations but only those elements that politically serve to strengthen the government’s domestic position.
If the former authorities negotiated territorial concessions, then they are the real culprits”
All governments around the world negotiate territorial exchange or return with the expectation of clear, guaranteed, and tangible outcomes. Conflicting parties in various regions (Kosovo, Moldova, Cyprus, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria) have conducted negotiations of similar substance. The issue is that Pashinyan presents this practice as if he were the first to speak the truth, while “the former authorities concealed it,” whereas in reality the government floods the public discourse exclusively with narratives that serve its own interests.
The “published documents” don’t reflect the real negotiation dynamics
In diplomacy, a negotiation working paper or draft never represents the full picture. Such papers may include informal proposals aimed at exerting pressure, verbal ideas generated during brainstorming, or working suggestions by mediators that may be “put on paper” but in no way carry the legal value of an agreement. Pashinyan manipulates these materials by presenting them as “final conclusions.”
The overwhelming majority of the published materials were not adopted documents, were not binding, were not signed, and do not reflect the full reality of negotiations. Thus, the entire process of filling the public agenda with false theses is far more a mechanism of political propaganda than the publication of documents serving national and state interests.
