Vartan Oskanian: Pashinyan’s peace—a masterclass in capitulation
In what can only be described as a tragicomic nadir of modern Armenian diplomacy, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has once again revealed the full extent of his political incompetence, strategic myopia, and astonishing readiness to capitulate—for no higher cause than the preservation of his own authority. His recent announcement, celebrating the conclusion of negotiations on a so-called “peace agreement” with Azerbaijan, should not be mistaken for a diplomatic achievement. It is, in fact, the clearest admission yet that Pashinyan has completely surrendered the Armenian national interest at the negotiating table, Vartan Oskanian, Former Foreign Minister of Armenia, writes.
“Let us begin with the glaring, inexcusable omissions that form the core of this disgrace. The agreement reportedly makes no mention of Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from the sovereign territories of Armenia that it continues to occupy. It says nothing about the release of Armenian prisoners illegally held in Baku, nor does it acknowledge the plight of Nagorno-Karabakh’s forcibly displaced Armenian population or affirm their right of return. These are not mere oversights—they are deliberate exclusions that amount to the abandonment of foundational national concerns. Pashinyan does not even make a token attempt to justify this deafening silence. The very heart of the conflict is brushed aside as if it were irrelevant. If that alone does not disqualify the agreement as a national embarrassment and betrayal, then surely the cumulative pattern of concessions extracted from Armenia under his leadership seals the verdict.
According to Pashinyan’s own statements, Armenia made two final concessions that now, in his words, render the agreement “ready to sign.” But ready for whom? Ready, perhaps, for Azerbaijan, which has already achieved tangible territorial and political gains through military aggression and diplomatic pressure. What this deal accomplishes is not peace—it is the formal codification of Armenia’s descent into subordination. It rewards the use of force, legitimizes the spoils of war, and treats Armenian sovereignty as a negotiable item on a checklist of Azerbaijani demands.
And yet, even this act of self-abasement may not produce finality. Two possible scenarios now loom, each darker than the last. In the first, Azerbaijan—having secured written Armenian concessions—may choose not to sign the document at all. Instead, it may opt to wait, confident that Armenia will unilaterally implement agreed-upon measures—such as the amendment of its constitution and the erasure of the OSCE Minsk Group. In the second scenario, Azerbaijan might sign the document ceremonially but withhold ratification in its parliament, just as Turkey did with the ill-fated Armenian-Turkish protocols in 2010. This tactic would allow Baku to continue applying pressure, extracting further Armenian concessions under the pretext of “unfulfilled obligations.” That painful episode should have been etched permanently into the memory of Armenian diplomacy. Instead, under Pashinyan, we are witnessing a near-exact reenactment of that humiliation. Once again, Armenia offers major concessions up front, while its counterpart reserves the right to delay implementation, demand more, and ultimately walk away if Armenian resistance surfaces.
Regardless of which path Azerbaijan chooses, the outcome is the same: the continued erosion of Armenian dignity, sovereignty, and security. Among the most alarming elements is the prospect of constitutional changes under foreign duress—an act that borders on political self-destruction. It is nothing short of national self-cannibalization. The very notion that Armenia might rewrite its foundational laws to satisfy the preconditions of an aggressor state is a grim echo of the worst post-conflict appeasement disasters in modern history.
Should this agreement be signed, it will not mark the dawn of a new era of peace. Rather, it will signal the formal end of the Armenian chapter in Nagorno-Karabakh’s long and tragic history. This is not peace won through dialogue and reconciliation; it is peace enforced through coercion, imbalance, and strategic vacuum. It will not be signed with dignity, but with resignation—perhaps even desperation.
And let there be no illusion: Azerbaijan understands this perfectly. They know they are not signing a deal with the Armenian nation or its people. They are signing a deal with Nikol Pashinyan and his narrow circle of political loyalists, whose overriding concern is not national integrity, but personal survival.
In surrendering so much for so little, Pashinyan may secure a signature, but not peace, not security, and certainly not history’s forgiveness,” Oskanian writes.
